Could we enrich speech-act theory to deal with discourse? Wittgenstein and Searle pointed out believe that we need the resources of formalisms (proof-, model-and game-theories) and of logic in pragmatics.
Introduction
In sciences that deal with language, thought and action, one now recognizes the essential role in communication of speech-acts such as acts of utterance, reference and predication, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts, and of attitudes such as speakers' beliefs, desires and intentions. One also understands the crucial importance of language-games that interlocutors collectively intend to conduct, of their forms of life and conversational background. According to speech-act theory the primary units of meaning and communication in the use and comprehension of language are not isolated true or false propositions but rather illocutionary acts which have felicity-conditions (Austin 1962) . Elementary illocutionary acts have a force (Frege 1977 ) and a propositional content. Interlocutors always intend to perform and communicate illocutions. Until now logic, philosophy and linguistics have mainly considered the speakers' ability to use and understand single sentences, without taking much into consideration their ability to conduct discourse. Similarly, speech-act theory has tended to study individual illocutions such as 1
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assertions, promises and requests that speakers attempt to perform by using sentences at single moments of utterance. However, speakers most often converse with other agents. Above all, the use of language is a social form of linguistic behaviour.
Can we extend speech-act theory to deal with discourse? Wittgenstein Interlocutors must come to agree on the kind of conversation that they want to pursue. Whenever they communicate in order to do difficult things, they have to describe their objective and to deliberate on how to proceed to achieve it. The aim of this paper is to present my approach towards discourse pragmatics and to compare it to others as regards methodology, hypotheses and issues. I will take into account previous 2
work in analytic philosophy (on action, attitudes and speech-acts), in social philosophy (on cooperation), in philosophical logic (on sense, denotation, illocutions, attitudes and action), in formal semantics (logical ideography, universal grammar, discourse representation), in conversation analysis (on maxims and background), in linguistics (on illocutionary markers and action verbs) and in psychology (on mutual understanding).
Issues addressed and theoretical objectives
Like Montague, I believe that pragmatics should use the resources of formalisms and logic in order to establish a rigorous theory of meaning and use. Natural languages can be learned by human agents whose cognitive abilities are creative but limited. Formalisms enable us to better construct linguistic competence and the mechanisms of understanding. However one must revise basic hypotheses of standard logics of propositions, attitudes and action in order to explicate felicity-conditions of illocutions.
Propositions with the same truth-conditions are not the contents of the same attitudes and illocutions, just as they are not the senses of synonymous sentences. One can assert and believe that Paris is a city without asserting and believing that it is a city and not an erythrocyte. Speech-act theory requires a finer criterion of propositional identity. It also requires explicating the intentionality and minimal rationality of interlocutors as well as the generation of speech-acts in the logic of action. We need illocutionary logic in the ideography of formal semantics in order to exhibit canonical forms of illocutions expressed by all syntactic types of sentences.
Of course the real units of conversation are intended rather than expressed illocutions. Often speakermeaning is different from sentence-meaning. In the cases of irony, indirection and metaphor, speakers do not speak literally, just as they do not speak seriously when they act in a theatre play. In order to contribute to discourse pragmatics, speech-act theory should explicate full speaker-meaning (all attempted illocutions whether literal, serious or not) and the structure and dynamics of dialogues that speakers are able to pursue by virtue of competence. For that purpose, we need a theory of conversational maxims (Grice 1975) and an analysis of relevant facts of conversational background. Unfortunately Grice's 3 Towards a Formal Pragmatics of Discourse D. Vanderveken maxims are vague and only apply to assertive utterances in informative discourse. We must generalize his approach and better explicate relevance in discourse than did Sperber and Wilson who neglect conversational goals. Moreover we must analyze what speakers do when they are not serious but pretend to perform illocutions in theatre or fiction. In order to account for discourse dynamics, one should exploit resources of game-theory and take advantage of new developments in dynamic, dialogical, paraconsistent and non-monotone logics, discourse representation and decision theories.
Since Montague many logicians and linguists have exploited formalisms such as proof-and model-theory originally conceived for artificial languages in order to develop semantics of natural languages. Some have indirectly interpreted ordinary sentences after translating them into an ideographical disambiguous object-language. Formalisms enable us to exhibit the deep structure common to all natural languages and to define speaker-meaning recursively. However primary units of meaning and communication are not isolated propositions, as Montague claims, but rather elementary illocutions such as assertions, questions and thanks, having a force in addition to a propositional content. Speakers making meaningful utterances attempt to perform illocutionary acts. So there is a force-marker in elementary sentences. Sentential type is the basic force-marker. Whenever they are used literally, declarative sentences serve to make assertions, interrogative sentences to ask questions, imperative sentences to give directives and optative sentences to express wish. Thus sentences with synonymous clauses like "You will help me", "Will you help me?", "Please, help me!" and "If only you would help me" express in the same contexts illocutions with the same content but different forces.
Similarly, sentences with the same force-marker like "Come!" and "Eat!" express illocutions with the same force but different contents. Grammarians have long acknowledged illocutionary aspects of sentence-meaning in their classification of sentential types. Thanks to speech-act theory one can better analyze force-markers. Imperative sentences like "Let's go!" whose verb is in the second person plural express an offer to implement a common action. Explicit performative sentences like "I hereby promise 4 Towards a Formal Pragmatics of Discourse D. Vanderveken to come" have the primary force of a declaration. They serve to declare rather than to simply assert that the speaker performs the illocution named by their performative verb.
Until now, traditional logic has mainly studied truth-conditions and valid theoretical inferences.
Thus formal semantics has mainly analyzed expressions like names, predicates and connectives whose meaning contributes to the determination of truth-conditions and it has tended to construct linguistic competence as being the speaker's ability to understand propositional contents. According to Davidson and Montague, the single most important objective of semantics is to formulate the theory of truth. For that reason, most applications of formal semantics to actual natural languages have been restricted to the interpretation of declarative sentences. However language serves to change the world as much as to describe it. There are five illocutionary points that speakers achieve on propositional contents.
Speakers express propositions in order to represent how things are (assertive point), to commit themselves to doing something (commissive point), to make an attempt to get hearers to act (directive point), to do things with words (declaratory point) and to express attitudes (expressive point). They make practical as well as theoretical inferences. Conclusions of theoretical inferences are assertive illocutions that are true or false. Whoever asserts a conjunction is committed to the truth of each conjunct. Conclusions of practical inferences are commissive, directive or declaratory illocutions representing actions of the speaker or hearer. Whoever asks a question requests an answer from the hearer. Thanks to illocutionary logic, formal semantics becomes able to analyze force-markers whose meaning contributes to the determination of felicity-conditions and to interpret, without any ad hoc reduction to declaratives, imperative, interrogative, performative, exclamatory and subjunctive sentences expressing illocutions with non-assertive forces. In my view, linguistic competence is inseparable from performance. It is the speaker' ability to perform illocutions.
By nature illocutions are intrinsically intentional actions: their performance by a speaker requires a verbal attempt. They have success-conditions. In order to succeed, speakers must correctly express intended illocutionary acts by using appropriate words, and make their attempt in an adequate context. A 5 Towards a Formal Pragmatics of Discourse D. Vanderveken baptism is not successful when the priest uses the wrong proper name or christens the wrong baby.
Speakers relate propositional contents to the world with the intention of establishing a correspondence between words and things from a certain direction of fit. Whoever makes an assertion intends to represent how things are in the world. Whoever gives an order intends to have the hearer do represented things.
Whoever makes a declaration intends to do represented things with words. Assertive utterances have the words-to-things direction of fit, commissive and directive utterances the things-to-words direction, and declarations the double direction of fit. Such illocutions have satisfaction-conditions. In order for an elementary illocution to be satisfied, it is not enough that its propositional content is true and corresponds to an existing fact in the world. The correspondence between words and things must be established from the proper direction of fit. Whoever obeys a command must do what is commanded because of that command. The notion of satisfaction is a generalization of that of truth needed to cover all forces. Thus an assertion is satisfied when it is true; a promise is satisfied when it is kept; a request when it is granted and a declaration when it is true because of its performance. Satisfaction involves intentional causation when forces have the things-to-words direction of fit.
Some successful illocutions are unsatisfied. Assertions can be false, promises can be violated and requests can be refused. However success, satisfaction and truth are logically related. The satisfaction of elementary illocutions requires the truth of their propositional content. Some illocutions have stronger conditions of success or of satisfaction than others. Whoever supplicates makes a request. Whenever a promise is kept, the assertion of its propositional content is true. Moreover the successful performance of certain illocutions requires the satisfaction of others. Successful declarations are satisfied. Conversely, satisfaction can require successful performance. Any kept promise has been made. Whoever understands felicity-conditions makes practical and theoretical valid inferences. He understands that certain illocutions cannot be performed and satisfied unless others are. So any competent speaker infers from a premise of the form "Any man is mortal and Socrates is a man" the conclusion "Socrates is mortal" (theoretical inference). Similarly, he infers from a premise of the form "You should help others" the 6 Towards a Formal Pragmatics of Discourse D. Vanderveken conclusion "Help others!" As one might expect, conclusions of theoretical inferences have the wordsto-things direction of fit, while conclusions of practical inferences have the things-to-words direction of fit.
We need a recursive unified theory of success, satisfaction and truth that accounts for all this. In my approach, the semantic theory of truth advocated by Montague and Davidson for natural language is part of a more general theory of satisfaction for illocutions with an arbitrary force. Earlier logics of speech-acts like Rescher's logic of commands, Belnap's logic of question and attempts to extend intensional logic to the interpretation of sentences in discourse (Kamp) wrongly suppose that successand satisfaction-conditions of illocutions are reducible to their truth-conditions. They ignore real felicity-conditions of speech-acts. Most approaches reduce, for example, a question to a set of possible answers to that question and then reduce these answers to their content.
Progress and methodology
In Foundations of Illocutionary Logic (Searle and Vanderveken 1985) we have decomposed each force into several components, namely: its illocutionary point(s), its mode of achievement of point, its propositional content, its preparatory and its sincerity conditions and its degree of strength.
We also recursively defined the set of all possible forces and success-conditions of illocutions that speakers perform at a given moment. The primitive forces are the five simplest forces with an illocutionary point: the force of assertion that corresponds to the performative verb "assert" and the declarative sentential type; the force of a commitment to a future action named by the performative "commit"; the force of a linguistic attempt to get the hearer to act expressed by the imperative sentential type; the force of declaration named by the performative verb "declare" and expressed in performative illocutions are determined by their force and content. An illocution of the form F(P) where F stands for a force and P for a proposition is successfully performed in a given context of utterance when, in that context, firstly the speaker succeeds in achieving the point of its force on its content with the required mode of achievement, secondly the proposition P satisfies the propositional content conditions of F, thirdly the speaker presupposes all propositions determined by preparatory conditions of its force and finally he also expresses with the required degree of strength all attitudes with the propositional content P determined by sincerity conditions. Thus a speaker makes a promise when he puts himself under an obligation to do something (mode of achievement of commissive point and propositional content condition), he presupposes that the action is good for the hearer (preparatory condition) and he expresses a strong intention to do it (degree of strength and sincerity condition).
Speakers can presuppose false propositions and express attitudes that they do not have. Certain promises are not beneficial to the hearer. Speakers also make promises that they do not intend to keep.
Such promises are defective. An illocution is non-defective when it is successful and all its preparatory and sincerity conditions are fulfilled. Austin with his notion of felicity-condition did not distinguish between successful utterances that are defective and utterances that are not even successful. In illocutionary logic, an illocution is felicitous when it is successful, non-defective and satisfied. John Searle and I (1985) analyzed the meaning of English force-markers and performative verbs and pointed out the declaratory nature of performative utterances. Many force markers contain modifiers of sentential type expressing particular force components. So sentences with the same syntactic type can express illocutions with different forces. Imperative sentences like "Do it please!" and "Do it whether you like it or not!" respectively express a request and a command. Exclamatory sentences like "How glad I am!" and "How sad I am!" serve to express different attitudes. We did not analyze in detail satisfaction-conditions of illocutions.
For that purpose, I later formulated a natural predicative logic of propositions taking into account their double nature: propositions are both senses of sentences and contents of actions and attitudes.
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They have a structure of constituents: in expressing propositions, we refer to objects through concepts and attribute to them properties and relations. We do not directly have in mind individual objects like material bodies and persons. We rather have in mind concepts of individuals and we indirectly refer to them through these concepts. So our thoughts and actions are directed at individuals under a concept rather than pure individuals. We ignore the truth-value of many propositions for we ignore real denotations of their constituents in many circumstances. We can refer to Smith's wife without knowing who she is. However, we can in principle think of persons who could be that wife. So in any use and interpretation of language, there are many possible denotation assignments to attributes and concepts in addition to the standard real denotation assignment that associates with senses their real denotation in each circumstance. Possible denotation assignments respect meaning-postulates. Only sets of individuals under concepts are possible denotations of first-order properties in each circumstance.
Wives are married women according to all assignments. In understanding propositions we simply know that their truth in a possible circumstance is compatible with some possible denotation assignments to their constituents and incompatible with others. In order to be true a proposition has of course to be true according to the real denotation assignment. Predicative logic explicates why propositions true in the same circumstances have a different cognitive value. Some have different structures of constituents.
So are propositions that mothers are women and that erythrocytes are red. Their expression requires different acts of predication. Others are not true according to the same possible denotation assignments.
So are propositions that whales are whales and that whales are mammals. We do not understand them as being true in the same conditions. Thus we can assert or believe necessary truths without asserting or believing others. Among all necessary truths, few are pure tautologies like the proposition that whales are whales which are true in all possible circumstances according to all possible denotation assignments.
There is no one-to-one correspondence between forces and English performative verbs or forcemarkers. Many markers and performative verbs are ambiguous. Moreover surface structures of force-9 Towards a Formal Pragmatics of Discourse D. Vanderveken markers and illocutionary verbs do not show the logical form of expressed forces. Sentential types such as the declarative, imperative and exclamatory types express the primitive assertive, directive and expressive forces, while the conditional and interrogative types express derived forces with additional components. As an example, a question is a directive with a special propositional content condition, namely that the hearer gives a correct answer to that question. Just as complex forces are obtained from simpler forces by adding components or by changing their degree of strength, complex force-markers are obtained by adding modifiers to sentential type. Imperative sentences whose verb is modified by please express requests. The adverb here expresses a polite mode of achievement: the speaker gives option of refusal to the hearer. And sentences like "Fortunately it is raining" and "Alas, it is raining" have a complex assertive force. The adverbs express here special preparatory and sincerity conditions. As Montague pointed out, by translating ordinary clauses into the object-language of intensional logic, formal semantics clarifies logical forms of propositions and achieves a better explication of truth-conditions. Similarly, by translating force-markers and performative verbs into the ideography of illocutionary logic, formal semantics clarifies logical forms of illocutions and achieves a better explication of felicity-conditions.
In Meaning & Speech Acts (Vanderveken 1990 -1) I developed a general formal semantics of success, satisfaction and truth capable of interpreting, after translation into ideography, non-declarative sentences and of formalizing practical inferences. According to the Routledge History of Philosophy (Volume 10) "The notion of a lingua philosophica as an ideal language containing both an intensional and illocutionary logic is no longer merely a program but has already in many respects been realized" (Cocchiarella 1997: 72) So there is a general ramification of fundamental semantic notions of analyticity, consistency and entailment. Moore's paradoxical sentence (Wittgenstein 1958 II x) "It is going to rain and I do not believe that" is analytically unsuccessful: it cannot be used literally with success. Speakers cannot simultaneously perform an illocution and deny its sincerity conditions. But since they can lie, Moore's sentence is not analytically unsatisfied. It expresses a true assertion in a context where the speaker insincerely asserts that it is going to rain. Moreover Moore's paradoxical sentence is illocutionarily consistent: it expresses performable assertions. Someone else could assert that it is going to rain and that I do not believe it by uttering another sentence. of utterances often depend on past utterances. Whoever replies to the question "How old are you?" by giving an age both makes an assertion and answers that question. We need a discourse representation (Kamp & Reyle 1993) in order to dynamically resolve ambiguities, ellipses, anaphors, presuppositions and force components. So semantics must consider in addition to the speaker, hearer(s), moment and place of each possible context of utterance its conversational background (forms of life, previous utterances, facts taken for granted and attitudes of interlocutors). We need a ramified conception of time (Prior 1967 ) and historic modalities (Thomason 1984) Over the past decade I have added to predicative propositional logic generalization, logical and historic modalities, ramified time and attitudes. I have also developed the logic of intentional action. To that end, I have analyzed agents' attempts that are actions of a special kind: personal, intentional, free and successful. Agents personally and voluntarily make their own attempts. Whoever attempts to make an attempt makes it. Agents make attempts in order to reach an objective. Whoever attempts to make an attempt succeeds in making that attempt, but he can fail to reach his objective. In such a case his attempt is unsatisfied. In my logic of action (2005), intentional actions are primary as in philosophy. Unintentional actions are generated by intentional actions and they could always have been attempted. So mistakes and failures are not actions but events that happen to us. Moreover no action is inevitable.
My theory formulates laws governing attempts and explicates the nature of intentional actions and basic actions. It accounts for the minimal rationality of agents who are neither perfectly rational nor entirely irrational. Minimal rationality is related to the way in which agents represent felicity-conditions. We can believe and attempt to do impossible things. Therefore, our subjective possibilities are not always objective. However there are impossible contradictory things that we cannot believe nor intend to do.
My analysis of subjective possibilities is based on the following truth-definition: a proposition is true according to an agent in a circumstance when he has in mind all its constituents and that proposition is true in that circumstance according to all possible denotation assignments then compatible with his beliefs. We often express properties without knowing which entities possess them, while nonetheless knowing that only certain entities could have these properties. Some, but not all, possible denotation 13 Towards a Formal Pragmatics of Discourse D. Vanderveken assignments are compatible with our beliefs. We ignore many essential properties of objects (properties that they really have in all possible circumstances). Possible denotation assignments compatible with our beliefs may violate essential properties. Thus we can be inconsistent and believe necessarily false propositions, for example that whales are fishes instead of mammals. However all possible denotation assignments do respect meaning-postulates. For that reason, we remain minimally rational. Since pure tautologies are always true according to all possible denotation assignments, we know a priori their necessary truth. We also always make valid inferences whose premises strongly imply their conclusion. A proposition strongly implies another when firstly it contains all its predications and secondly it tautologically implies it. For example, the elimination of disjunction generates strong implication.
Therefore a desire to drink beer or wine contains a desire to drink. On the contrary, the introduction of disjunction does not generate such a strong implication, for its conclusion can have new senses. A desire to drink does not contain a desire to drink or die. My relation of strong implication requires much more than Lewis' strict implication: it is finite, paraconsistent, tautological, analytic and decidable.
It still remains to fully explicate intentional causation. In order that an agent succeeds in doing things, these things must be caused by his attempt. Sometimes the agent's attempt is the cause why intended things occur. However often there is causal overdetermination: agents do things for different reasons. The agent's attempt can simply be a practical reason why they occurred. I will analyze practical reasons in order to explicate intentional causation and satisfaction-conditions of illocutions with the things-to-words direction of fit. A hearer obeys a previous command when that command is a practical reason for his doing the things commanded. 
Sentence-meaning and speaker-meaning in conversation
Force, sense and denotation are three components of sentence-and speaker-meaning. Which illocutionary acts does a speaker mean to perform in a context of utterance? Speech-act theory adopts a principle of literality: it identifies speaker-meaning with sentence-meaning whenever possible. In that view, the speaker primarily attempts to perform the literal individual illocution expressed by the sentence that he uses when such an act is then performable. Natural languages offer rich linguistic means to express forces. Many scholars forget such means, either ignoring force in their semantics or multiplying unnecessarily literal forces. Following Grice, Searle and I do not multiply without reason sentencemeaning and semantic ambiguity. We appeal as much as possible to conversational maxims and 15
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background to explicate non-literal speaker-meaning. Thus declarative, interrogative and optative sentences like "I desire your help", "If only you would help me" and "Could you help me?" that are often used to make indirect requests of help respectively express literal assertions, questions and wishes in general semantics. As Grice (1975) By virtue of its logical form each attempted illocution commits the speaker to many other acts. A speech-act strongly commits the speaker to another when he could not then perform that act without performing the other. All predictions contain an assertion but not conversely. Assertions about the past are not predictions. Whoever means to perform an illocution eo ipso attempts to perform others with less success-conditions. But speakers are also committed to performing stronger illocutions. Whoever replies to an assertion by saying the contrary does more than assert the negation of its content. He then contradicts the previous speaker. General semantics can now explicate by simple generation such commitments to stronger illocutions. In contexts where certain propositional, preparatory or sincerity conditions are fulfilled, the successful literal illocution simply generates illocutions with a stronger force.
In other contexts, there is no such illocutionary generation.
As Searle and I pointed out, speakers are also weakly committed to illocutions that they do not overtly perform. Whoever agrees to help everybody is committed to agreeing to help you even if he did not make any reference to you. No one can literally say "I refuse to help you and I agree to help everybody". Attempts can fail. But whoever attempts to perform an illocution is weakly committed to that illocution. Could we explicate to which speech-acts a speaker is weakly committed? There is a reflexive and symmetrical relation of agentive compatibility in the logic of action. Two moments are compatible as regards an agent when all actions that he performs at these two moments are simultaneously performable. A speaker is weakly committed to an illocution in a context when he could then perform that illocution at any moment that is compatible as regards that agent with the moment of utterance of that context. All the laws governing weak illocutionary commitment follow from this definition. Speaker-meaning is often different from sentence-meaning in dialogue. Not only do interlocutors speak non-literally and non-seriously, but they also share forms of life and attempt by verbal interactions to achieve common goals and to perform together actions. As Wittgenstein (1958) pointed out, sentences are instruments that have roles and functions in language-games. He says: "Here the term "language-game" is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, of a form of life" (Wittgenstein 1958: 23) . Our question is now: could we generalize speech-act theory to deal with conversation? First of all, many attempted illocutions are non-literal or non-serious, as I said before. Whoever expresses an illocution that is obviously unperformable or insatisfiable, given background-knowledge, means to perform another illocution. In Grice's approach, in order to understand non-literal illocutions, the hearer must first determine the literal illocution and understand that the speaker cannot just mean to perform that speech-act if he respects conversational maxims, given mutually known facts of the background. In order to explicate speaker-meaning, pragmatics must add to semantics, (Otherwise the content of your directive will not be as strong as needed.)
There are normal forms of inferences leading to attempted non-literal illocutions. Their premises contain finitely many background-facts whose existence is taken for granted by speakers. So a theoretical approach is in principle compatible with the openness of the background. Relevant facts are contents of attitudes and related to felicity-conditions. Hearers infer what speakers non-literally mean in exploiting and using conversational maxims (Grice 1975) . In my view, a speaker exploits a maxim when he wants the hearer to recognize background-facts that would prevent him from respecting that maxim if his primary illocution were literal. Yet he clearly wants to cooperate and he can respect the maxim without violating another one. Therefore he then primarily means to perform another non-literal illocution, and he wants to communicate this. Irony and sarcasm are special cases of exploitation of the maxim of quality while indirection and hyperbole are exploitations of the maxim of quantity. In the case of irony, speakermeaning is in opposition with sentence-meaning. It is part of background-knowledge that literal felicityconditions are violated and that the speaker is attempting to perform non-literal illocutions with opposite 18
conditions. The speaker's irony is directed to components of literal force and content determining violated felicity-conditions. By saying "I promise to attack you" a speaker ironically threatens the hearer when the future action is obviously bad for him. His irony then concerns the preparatory condition. By saying "I thank you for your help" a speaker ironically complains that the hearer did not help him when he is obviously not grateful but dissatisfied because he did not receive any help. The irony then relates to both the sincerity condition and the propositional content.
In the case of indirect speech-acts, speaker-meaning is an extension of sentence-meaning. The speaker relies on the fact that the literal illocution is too weak to achieve his linguistic purposes. Most often the speaker intends to achieve another point on the propositional content, and non-literal preparatory or sincerity conditions are obviously fulfilled. So one can indirectly promise help by saying "I will help you." When indirection is directed to propositional content, satisfaction-conditions of the literal speech-act are felicity-conditions of the indirect act. The speaker can assert that these conditions obtain. He can also ask the hearer whether they obtain. Given the background, the literal assertion is then obviously true and the literal question has or could have a positive answer. We often indirectly offer and even promise help by saying "I could help you", "Can I help you?" (preparatory conditions of the indirect act), "I intend to help you", (sincerity conditions), "I should help you", "Should I help you?" (mode of achievement). In such idiomatic uses, the propositional content of the indirect illocution is part of the literal content. An indirect speech-act is categorical whenever its non-literal felicity-conditions are part of backgroundknowledge. Sometimes the speaker's intentions depend on the hearer's answer. In such cases, the indirect speech-act is conditional. We just indirectly offer help when we ask whether the hearer is willing to receive help. Such offers are indirect promises that are conditional on the hearer's acceptance. illocutions are together as strong as needed to achieve all his purposes. Other figures of speech and maxims can be defined in my approach. Searle (1982) pointed out some important difficulties for theories of discourse: interlocutors often have no conversational goal; they freely change kinds and topics of dialogue; they can make unsuccessful and totally irrelevant utterances without breaking the conversation; their intentionality is collective.
Moreover the conversational background is indefinitely open and therefore not exhaustively describable. I have replied to Searle (Vanderveken 2001) , saying the following. Of course, speakers are engaged in social forms of life and their purpose is often extra-linguistic. They communicate in order to coordinate non-verbal actions intelligently. I agree with Wittgenstein (1958) and Searle (1982) that there is no possible theory of all possible language-games. There are countless kinds of forms of life and objectives that we could share as human beings. So there are "countless kinds" of language-games that we could practise. As Wittgenstein puts it, "… this multiplicity is not something fixed, given once for all; but new types of language, new language-games, as we may say, come into existence, and others become obsolete and get forgotten" (Wittgenstein 1958: 23) However in any dialogue speakers always mean to perform relevant illocutions in order to contribute to verbal exchanges such as presentations, justifications, debates, compromises and agreements which are higher-level speech-acts whose goal is conversational with no direction of fit (greetings, eulogies, welcomes and protestations) have an expressive goal: they just serve to express common attitudes. Competent speakers are all able to achieve conversational goal because they have intentionality. There is a one-to-one correspondence between conversational goals and possible directions of fit because interlocutors are protagonists in dialogues. In single contexts of utterances, the speaker is active while the hearer is passive. No speaker can commit someone else to an action by his personal utterance. He can only commit himself or give a directive to another agent. So language distinguishes two illocutionary points with the things-to-words direction of fit. When the utterance is commissive, the responsibility for changing the world lies on the speaker; when it is directive, it lies on the hearer. However, the speech-situation is entirely different in a collective deliberation. Any hearer is a potential speaker who can speak in his turn and make a contribution.
Hearers can reply to speakers who give them directives and accept or refuse to commit themselves later. Often, speakers' commitments are conditional upon future hearers' commitments. So there is a single conversational goal while there are two illocutionary points with the things-to-words direction of fit. Deliberations serve both to commit speakers and to attempt to convince hearers that they should carry out reciprocal actions in the world. Interlocutors take for granted that preparatory conditions obtain in the background. For example, during a medical consultation, one presupposes that the consulted person has skills in medicine and the consulting speaker wants advice for his health. Finally, many discourse types require that protagonists express common attitudes. In order to exchange greetings, speakers must express courteous acknowledgements of the other's presence upon their encountering one other. Two language-games have the same discourse type when they have the same conversational goals, the same mode of achievement and the same thematic, background-and sincerity-conditions. I have recursively defined the set of all possible conversation types and systematically analyzed their felicity-conditions. The four primitive discourse types are the simplest types with one conversational goal: description, deliberation, declaration and expression, common respectively to all descriptive, deliberative, declaratory and expressive language-games. I hold that complex discourse types are obtained by adding new components to primitive types. Thus the type of negotiation has a special mode of achievement of the deliberative goal: protagonists take counsel together as how to act. The type of bargaining has an additional thematic condition: protagonists negotiate the purchase and selling of certain things. The type of peace talks has a special background condition: negotiators represent belligerent parties and are authorised to conclude peace. Finally, attempts of friendly settlements have a special sincerity condition: negotiators express their will to come to an arrangement without animosity.
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Each discourse component determines a particular success-condition corresponding to a constitutive rule. Protagonists succeed in conducting a discourse of a given type during an interval of time when firstly, their theme satisfies thematic conditions of their type, secondly, they achieve the conversational goal on the theme with the required mode of achievement, thirdly, they presuppose that required background-conditions obtain and finally they express attitudes required by the sincerity conditions. Thus speakers bargain when they deliberate on a purchase and sale, (discursive goal and thematic conditions), they negotiate by making offers, counteroffers, acceptances or refusals of trade (mode of achievement), they take for granted that they are potential buyers and sellers (backgroundconditions) and they express their will to do business (sincerity conditions). Discourse types having more components than others have stronger success-conditions. Thus any negotiation is a deliberation.
Bargaining sessions, peace talks and attempts at friendly settlements are negotiations.
Notice that success-conditions of discourses are not the sum of success-conditions of their successive illocutions. First of all, as Roulet (1990) pointed out, a dialogue is not to be divided immediately into the finite sequence of individual illocutions attempted in its successive utterances. In my view, a dialogue with a conversational type is rather a sequence of higher-order collective illocutions where speakers proceed to make salutations, presentations, take positions, respond in concert with one other, attempt to make a decision, argue and give justifications, make replies, comments, summaries and conclusions. The conduct of discourses with a conversational goal only requires the successful performance (and sometimes also the felicity) of master illocutions (Foster 1984) Sperber and Wilson have studied relevance. But most have ignored discursive types. In my opinion, one should reinforce the theoretical approach to conversation by integrating semantics and pragmatics within a general formal discourse pragmatics studying the logical structure and dynamics of all types of dialogues with a proper conversational goal. A discourse pragmatics too dependent on the terminology of ordinary language and deprived of theoretical vocabulary is not advisable.
Which resources does language put at our disposal in order to conduct dialogues? There are a lot of conversation verbs, including performatives (Austin's expositives). One can proceed to a reasoned lexical analysis of conversation verbs on the basis of my typology. There is no one-to-one correspondence between discursive types and conversation verbs just as there is no one-to-one correspondence between illocutionary forces and performative verbs. Verbs like "inform" and "bet" name both a discourse type and an individual illocutionary act that is capital in such discourses.
Conversation verbs such as "reply" and "conclude" name parts of discourse without a proper conversational goal. A reply can be of any goal. Certain conversation verbs like "debate" and "argue" are ambiguous. Argumentations in favour or against a certain thesis are descriptive, argumentations in favour or against a certain course of action are deliberative. When a conversation verb is ambiguous, discursive types corresponding to it share certain features. Protagonists who argue try to convince each other. This is a special mode of achievement of argumentations.
In order to contribute to the foundations of discourse pragmatics, it is important to further analyze like Searle and Tuomela the nature of collective attitudes and actions in philosophy of mind and action.
Dialogues with a conversational goal are joint illocutions whose conduct requires a specific constitutive collective intentionality and cooperation between interlocutors. How do speakers come to share the same conversational intention and to coordinate their contributions? Do they negotiate conversational types?
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According to which principles do they choose their way to perform intended illocutions? How does conversational background intervene? We revise and revoke previous attitudes and illocutions when they turn out to be defective or insatisfiable. Paraconsistent and non-monotone logics (da Costa, Prakke & Vreeswijk) are most useful to characterize how we reason when previous information turns to be incomplete, false or even inconsistent. We also have to exploit new developments in dialogical logic (Lorenz, Hintikka, van Benthem) in order to characterize the proper dynamics of dialogues whose goal is discursive. The goal of dialogues of standard dialogical logic is to check whether an initial assertion is or not valid. One should better characterize the illocutionary nature of moves permitted in such dialogues. Not all defences are categorical assertions. Some are conditional assertions. Moreover attacks are directives. With M. Paquette I will use game theory (Von Neumann) in order to develop a qualitative theory of decision defining a choice value in a way comparable with the Bayesian theory in terms of a hierarchical set of preferences and a probability structure (Doyle) rather than probability functions. Our aim is to define success (the existence of a solution) as Nash equilibrium for simple dialogues with a conversational goal. I also plan to use the theory of discourse representation in order to analyze conversational theme and background dependence of attempted illocutions. In considering utterances within exchanges, discourse pragmatics gives a new prospect to the theory of meaning which becomes more dynamic and collective. Speakers can clarify the meaning of previous utterances and give them a new interpretation.
